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TERRITORIAL TAXATION: WHY SOME
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ROM the early days of the modern U.S. income tax until the pre-
sent, domestic corporations, as well as U.S. citizens and residents,
have been taxed on their worldwide incomes.1 Gross income in-
cludes income "from whatever source derived."' 2 Since a U.S. person's
income from sources outside the United States is often also taxed by the
countries from which the income originates, the law allows U.S. persons a
credit against U.S. tax for income taxes paid to other countries. 3 In order
to restrict the credit to its function of alleviating double taxation, the law
limits this credit to the amount of the U.S. tax, before credit, on the tax-
payer's income from foreign sources.4
A shareholder is generally not taxed on undistributed corporate earn-
ings, whether the shareholder is a U.S. or foreign person and whether the
corporation is domestic or foreign. U.S. taxation of these earnings at the
corporate level is, however, significantly affected by whether the corpora-
tion is domestic or foreign. 5 The United States taxes domestic corpora-
tions on their worldwide incomes, with credit for foreign income taxes,
but it only taxes foreign corporations on income from U.S. sources and
on income effectively connected with U.S. trades or businesses. 6 Thus,
* Lawrence Lokken is Hugh H. Culverhouse Eminent Scholar and Professor of Law,
University of Florida College of Law. Some of the points made in this article are con-
tained in an earlier article. Lawrence Lokken, Does the U.S. Tax System Disadvantage U.S.
Multinationals in the World Marketplace?, 4 TAX'N OF GLOBAL TRANSACTIONS 53 (2004).
1. For the early history of the U.S. international tax system, see Michale T. Graetz &
Michael M. O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J.
1021 (1997).
2. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1994).
3. I.R.C. § 901; see 3 BORIS I. BiTrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATON
OF INCOME, ESTATES & GIrs 72.1 (rev. 3d ed. 2005).
4. I.R.C. § 904; see BirKER & LOKKEN, supra note 3, 72.6.1.
5. A corporation is domestic if organized under the laws of the United States, one of
the U.S. states or the District of Columbia; and it is foreign if it is organized under the laws
of any other jurisdiction. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4), (5).
6. I.R.C. §§ 61(a), 882(b); see BITrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 3, 167.1.1.
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foreign income of U.S.-owned foreign corporations is generally not sub-
jected to U.S. taxation until it is distributed as dividends.
Dividends from a foreign corporation are fully taxable, even if the re-
cipient is a corporation and owns all of the distributing corporation's
stock.7 However, a domestic corporation owning at least 10% of a for-
eign corporation's voting stock is, upon receiving dividends, treated as
having paid a ratable share of the foreign income taxes paid by the dis-
tributing corporation.8 An amount equal to the foreign income taxes
deemed paid is included in the domestic corporation's gross income as an
additional dividend. 9 Apart from the fact that U.S. taxation is delayed
until dividends are distributed, a domestic corporation is taxed on earn-
ings repatriated from a foreign subsidiary essentially as though the do-
mestic corporation had directly earned the repatriated income.10
The opportunity to defer U.S. taxation of unrepatriated earnings of
U.S.-owned foreign corporations is limited by the Internal Revenue Code
("I.R.C.") rules on controlled foreign corporations ("CFC"s), commonly
known as subpart F."1 A U.S. shareholder of a CFC is directly taxed on
several categories of CFC income, including dividends, interest, royalties,
and income from sales and service transactions not sufficiently connected
to the CFC's home country.12 Most of the income directly taxed to U.S.
shareholders is called "subpart F income." Very generally, the effect of
the CFC rules is to restrict the deferral opportunity to active business
income.
In November 2005, an Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, which
the President had charged with developing plans for reforming the fed-
7. On receiving dividends from a domestic subsidiary, in contrast, a domestic corpo-
ration is allowed a deduction equal to all or some portion of the dividends. I.R.C. § 243(a).
8. I.R.C. § 902; see BITrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 3, 9 72.9.1.
9. I.R.C. § 78.
10. Assume USCo earns 1,000 by a business carried on in foreign country X, which
imposes tax of 300 on this income. If USCo conducts the business as a branch, it must
include the country X income in its U.S. taxable income and is allowed a foreign tax credit
of 300. If its precredit U.S. tax is a flat 35% of taxable income, its net U.S. tax on the
country X income is 50 (precredit tax of 350, less credit of 300). But, if USCo carries on
the country X business through a subsidiary organized under country X law and the subsid-
iary promptly distributes its after-tax income to USCo, USCo receives dividends of 700
(1,000 of pretax earnings, less 300 of country X tax), is deemed to pay 300 of country X tax,
and has deemed dividends of 300. Its precredit U.S. tax on the country X income is thus
350 (35% of the sum of 700 and 300), it is allowed credit of 300, and its net U.S. tax on the
country X earnings is 50. See United States v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 493 U.S. 132,
140 (1989) (legislative history of indirect credit "reflects an intent to equalize treatment
between domestic corporations that operate through foreign subsidiaries and those that
operate through unincorporated foreign branches").
11. A foreign corporation is a CFC if more than one half of its stock, by vote or by
value, is owned by "United States shareholders." I.R.C. § 957(a). A U.S. shareholder is a
U.S. person (U.S. citizen or resident or domestic corporation, partnership, trust, or estate)
that owns at least 10% of a foreign corporation's voting stock. I.R.C. § 951(b). For pur-
poses of both of these rules, stock ownership includes direct, indirect, and constructive
ownership, as defined in I.R.C. § 958. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 3, 91 69.2. The
term "subpart F" derives from the fact that most of the CFC rules are found in subpart F of
part III of subchapter N of chapter 1 of subtitle A of the I.R.C.
12. See BITiKER & LOKKEN, supra note 3, 69.1.
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eral tax system, issued a report outlining two alternative plans, one of
them being a plan to reform the present income tax and the other being a
plan to convert the income tax into a tax on consumption.13 The first of
these plans, which the Panel called a Simplified Income Tax Plan, pro-
posed a significant alteration of the rules for taxing foreign income of
U.S. companies: a move from the present credit system to a territorial or
exemption system. Under an exemption system, a U.S. person's income
from active business operations in foreign countries, whether carried on
directly or through subsidiary corporations, would be exempted from
U.S. taxation. Earlier in 2005, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion suggested a similar shift. 14
As described more fully below, in recommending an exemption system,
the Panel and Joint Committee staff relied on two arguments: (1) The
current system, by deferring taxation of foreign earnings of U.S.-owned
foreign corporations, distorts business decisions on where and how to in-
vest these earnings; and (2) the current system often allows U.S. multina-
tional enterprises to achieve U.S. tax results more favorable than they
could obtain under a territorial system. 15 As others have pointed out, the
first objection to current law could be addressed by curtailing the deferral
opportunity. 16
This article addresses the second of the justifications offered for an ex-
emption system. It explains some of the techniques used by U.S. multina-
tional enterprises to achieve U.S. tax results more favorable than
territorial taxation, and it examines whether these results are inevitable
consequences of the current regime or flow from aspects of the present
rules that could easily be changed. The article concludes that Congress
and the Treasury could, without adding significant complexity to the law,
reform the historical worldwide/credit system in ways that would ensure
tax results largely consistent with the underlying premises of this system.
II. THE PROPOSALS
A. THEIR SUBSTANCE
The Panel and Joint Committee Staff advocate a two-part system for
taxing international income of domestic corporations. Active business in-
come earned abroad through branches and foreign subsidiaries would be
exempted from U.S. taxation. Expenses attributable to this income
would not be deductible, and foreign income taxes on the income would
not be creditable. Other income of a domestic corporation from foreign
13. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND
PRo-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM (2005) [hereinafter PRESI-
DENT'S ADVISORY PANEL].
14. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COM-
PLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES (2005) [hereinafter STAFF OF J. COMM.].
15. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 13, at 103; STAFF OF J. COMM., supra
note 14, at 188.
16. See generally J. Clifton Fleming Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Exploring the Contours of
a Proposed U.S. Exemption (Territorial) Tax System, 109 TAX NOTES 1557 (2005).
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sources would be included in the U.S. tax base, and foreign income taxes
on this income would be creditable, as under present law. The CFC rules
would also continue without significant change. 17
Although both proposals use the term "territorial," the proposed sys-
tems are not truly territorial because they would only exempt foreign
source income meeting specific eligibility criteria and would retain the
present worldwide/credit system for all other income. The proposals are
modeled on systems prevalent in continental Europe, which are usually
referred to as exemption systems.18 They do not follow the example of
countries that tax their residents on no income from sources outside the
country, regardless of character, which may more accurately be termed
territorial taxation.19 The term "exemption system" is used in this paper.
Under the proposals, a domestic corporation would be exempt from
U.S. tax on dividends received from a foreign corporation only if the dis-
tributing corporation is a CFC and the domestic corporation owns at least
10% of the CFC's voting stock (that is, is a "United States share-
holder"). 20 A foreign corporation is a CFC if more than one half of its
stock, by vote or by value, is owned by U.S. shareholders.21 The exemp-
tion would also encompass income of active businesses that a domestic
corporation carries on as branches in foreign countries.22
Foreign income taxes allocable to exempt income would be neither
creditable nor deductible. For example, a domestic corporation would be
allowed no credit or deduction for a foreign withholding tax on exempt
dividends, and I.R.C. § 902, which treats a domestic corporation receiving
dividends from a foreign corporation in which it owns at least 10% of the
voting stock as though it had paid a ratable portion of the foreign income
taxes paid by the foreign corporation, would not apply to a domestic cor-
poration receiving exempt dividends.23
Also, a domestic corporation with exempted income would not be al-
lowed deductions for expenses allocated and apportioned to exempt in-
17. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 13, at 134 (observing that CFC rules
are "common in territorial systems around the world"); STAFF OF J. COMM., supra note 14,
at 189.
18. For a description of one such system, see NETHERLANDS MINISTRY OF FIN., TAXA-
TION IN THE NETHERLANDS 13-15 (2005), available at http://www.minfin.nl/ (follow "En-
glish" hyperlink; then follow "taxation" hyperlink).
19. Hong Kong is one of the few jurisdictions having such a system. See GOV'T OF
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMIN. REGION, INLAND REVENUE DEP'T, A SIMPLE GUIDE ON
THE TERRITORIAL SOURCE PRINCIPLE OF TAXATION, available at http://www.ird.gov.hk/
eng/pafbus-pft-tsp.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2006).
20. STAFF OF J. COMM., supra note 14, at 190. The Joint Committee Staff's explana-
tion of its proposals is more detailed than the Advisory Panel's explanation. The descrip-
tion in the text is thus drawn primarily from the staff's explanation. For the term "United
States shareholder," see I.R.C. § 951(b) (West 2006).
21. I.R.C. § 957(a) (1994).
22. Although the proposals are not specific on the point, the term "active business
income" probably refers to income that would not be subpart F income if it were income of
a CFC.
23. I.R.C. § 902.
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come.2 4 According to the Joint Committee Staff, "for expense allocation
purposes, CFC earnings would be treated as giving rise to foreign-source
income as they are earned. '2 5 Assume USCo, a Delaware corporation, is
sole shareholder of FCo, which is organized in country X and operates a
manufacturing business in that country. During year 1, FCo has income of
500, all of which is produced in the manufacturing business, and it distrib-
utes 200 to USCo as dividends. Under the proposals, the dividends are
excluded from USCo's gross income, but USCo may not deduct expenses
attributable to FCo's income of 500.
The Panel and the Joint Committee Staff both recognize that economi-
cally realistic allocations and apportionments of deductions would be cru-
cial to an appropriate implementation of the proposals.2 6 If a domestic
corporation incurs expenses in earning exempt income, but fails to allo-
cate or apportion the expenses to the exempt income, the expenses effec-
tively shelter nonexempt income from tax and thereby broaden the
exemption to income equal to the sum of the properly exempted income
and the improperly deducted expenses. On the other hand, if expenses
incurred in earning nonexempt income are allocated against exempt in-
come, the taxpayer is effectively denied the exemption to the extent of
the improperly allocated expenses. Appropriate expense allocations are
also of vital importance under current law, but both proposals suggest
that this process may be even more crucial under an exemption system.27
The Panel also notes that arm's length pricing of goods and services
transferred among and performed for related value would be "even more
important in a territorial system than under current law" and that "addi-
tional resources would need to be devoted to examining these transfer
prices." s28 For example, if USCo sells goods to FCo at a price less than an
arm's length price for the goods, FCo's income on reselling the goods will
include income actually earned by USCo, and this income will be exempt
from U.S. tax as it is realized by FCo and as it is distributed to USCo as
dividends.
Under the proposals, a U.S. person's U.S. taxable income includes all
foreign-source income other than CFC dividends and active business in-
come of branches.2 9 Assume USCo licenses country X rights to valuable
intangibles to FCo, and FCo pays royalties to USCo of 140, from which
FCo withholds 14 of country X tax. Under the proposals, USCo must
include the royalties in its U.S. gross income, but it is allowed deductions
for expenses attributable to the royalties and is allowed credit for foreign
24. For the allocation and apportionment of deductions between income from foreign
sources (the statutory grouping) and U.S. sources (residual gross income), see Treas. Reg.
§ 1.861-8 (1996), discussed in BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 3, 73.10.1.
25. STAFF OF J COMM., supra note 14, at 190.
26. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 13, at 134 (suggesting the adoption of
"[r]easonable rules" to ensure that "expenses incurred in the United States to generate
exempt foreign income would not be deductible" for U.S. tax purposes).
27. Id.




income taxes on the royalties. For example, if USCo has 40 of expenses
allocable to the royalties and its precredit U.S. tax is at a flat 35%, its
precredit tax on the royalties is 35 (35%of the excess of 140 over 40), it
has a foreign tax credit of 14, and its after-credit tax on the royalties is 21.
B. THE JUSTIFICATIONS OFFERED
The Panel and the Joint Committee Staff proposals rest on two groups
of arguments: that the present worldwide/credit system distorts business
and investment decisions and that credit rules are not effective in restrict-
ing the credit to its role of alleviating double taxation. Only the second of
these justifications is analyzed in this paper, but both of them are de-
scribed here.
The Joint Committee staff explains the first justification as follows:
It has long been recognized that the worldwide, deferral-based sys-
tem of present law distorts business decisions in a number of ways.
By establishing repatriation as the system's principal taxable event,
the worldwide, deferral-based system creates incentives in many
cases to redeploy foreign earnings abroad instead of in the United
States, thereby distorting corporate cash-management and financing
decisions. At the same time, basing the system on repatriation ren-
ders the payment of U.S. tax on foreign-source business income sub-
stantially elective in many cases, because repatriation itself is
elective. By maintaining deferral indefinitely, a taxpayer may
achieve a result that is economically equivalent to 100-percent ex-
emption of income, with no corresponding disallowance of expenses
allocable to the exempt income, provided that the taxpayer does not
repatriate the earnings or run afoul of subpart F or other anti-defer-
ral rules.30
According to the Panel,
Research on the consequences of adopting a territorial system for
the United States suggests that this reform could lead to both effi-
ciency and simplification gains. Economists have found that the fi-
nancial decisions of corporate managers are extremely sensitive to
the tax on repatriations-lower U.S. taxes on dividend repatriations
lead to higher dividend payments and vice-versa. This correlation im-
plies that repatriation taxes reduce aggregate dividend payouts and
generate an efficiency loss that would disappear if active foreign
30. STAFF OF J. COMM., supra note 14, at 188-89. The Panel expresses this idea as
follows:
because the active business income of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parent cor-
porations generally is not taxable at home until it is distributed as dividends,
the U.S. tax on dividend payments can be thought of as elective, much like
the tax on capital gains. Due to the "time value of money" advantage of
postponing tax payments, this deferral of U.S. tax allows foreign business
income to be taxed at a lower effective rate than it would be if it were earned
in the United States. This creates an incentive for the foreign subsidiary to
retain the earnings as long as possible and distorts other business and invest-
ment decisions.
PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 13, at 103.
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source income were exempt from U.S. tax. Corporate managers
would be able to arrange corporate affairs and financial policies to
meet objectives other than tax avoidance if they were freed from
worrying about how to time repatriations of foreign income to re-
duce U.S. taxes. 31
The worldwide/credit system is often justified on grounds of capital ex-
port neutrality, the idea that the tax law should, to the extent possible,
not influence U.S. persons' choice between investing and doing business
in the United States and investing and doing business in other countries. 32
It would seem that a move to an exemption system would encourage U.S.
companies to move investments and resulting employment opportunities
to countries with lower tax rates and thereby sacrifice capital export neu-
trality. According to the Panel, however, "Researchers found no defini-
tive evidence that location incentives would be significantly changed,
which suggests that the territorial system the Panel has proposed would
not drive U.S. jobs and capital abroad relative to the current system."' 33
The Panel finds this result "surprising" because the present system, al-
though in concept based on worldwide taxation, is sufficiently malleable
to allow many taxpayers to achieve results even more favorable than
those under a territorial system.34
According to the Panel, its proposals would "update our international
tax regime. '35 The Panel notes that many countries of continental Eu-
rope use exemption systems similar to the system it proposes and that
Canada, which had historically used a credit system like the United
States, has recently adopted a similar exemption system.36 The Joint
Committee Staff describes these systems as follows:
Many countries tax resident corporations on a predominantly territo-
rial basis by exempting dividends received from foreign subsidiaries
from residence-country tax. This exemption typically applies only
where the parent company's ownership in the subsidiary exceeds a
certain threshold (commonly five to 10 percent), and the exemption
may be total or partial (e.g., only 95 percent, or 60 percent, of quali-
fying dividends might be exempted, as a proxy for disallowing ex-
penses allocable to exempt income). A number of restrictions
generally apply, in order to limit the exemption to certain categories
of income (e.g., active business income) and to address concerns
about shifting income to lower-tax countries in order to avoid tax.
31. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 13, at 134.
32. See, e.g., T.D. 8767, 1998-1 C.B. 875; STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH
CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM Acr OF 1986, at 964-65 (1987);
Lawrence Lokken, Whatever Happened To Subpart F? U.S. CFC Legislation After the
Check-the-Box Regulations, FLA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2006).
33. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 13, at 135.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 132.
36. The Panel does not note that many other countries, including the United Kingdom
and Japan, use a credit system generally resembling that of the United States. It does not
explain why it believes that its recommendation would "update" the U.S. international tax
system, rather than merely change it.
SMU LAW REVIEW
These exemption systems generally do impose tax on foreign-source
royalties and portfolio type income. 37
The Panel notes that the limitation on the maximum foreign tax credit
must be applied with "[m]any complicated rules," which often "allow
companies to arrange their affairs so that they can avoid taxes on income
earned abroad if they are able to simultaneously repatriate certain in-
come that has been subjected to high rates of foreign tax and other in-
come that has been subject to low rates of foreign tax."'38 The Panel
states further:
[T]he tax planning opportunities engendered by the complicated
rules surrounding deferral may allow some corporations to help
themselves to results that are more favorable than territorial taxa-
tion. As a result, the active foreign income of some multinationals is
taxed more heavily under the current system than it would be in a
predominantly territorial system, while similar income earned by
other multinationals is functionally exempt from U.S. tax through
"self-help." Meanwhile, the income of a third group of multination-
als may be taxed at a negative rate. The result of this complexity is
that the actual rates of tax paid by U.S. companies on their world-
wide income vary widely from year to year, and from company to
company, based on the range of foreign operations and the sophisti-
cation of their tax planning.39
According to the Joint Committee staff,
The present-law system ... creates a sort of paradox of defects: on
the one hand, the system allows tax results so favorable to taxpayers
in many instances as to call into question whether it adequately
serves the purposes of promoting capital export neutrality or raising
revenue; on the other hand, even as it allows these results, the system
arguably imposes on taxpayers a greater degree of complexity and
distortion of economic decision making than that faced by taxpayers
based in countries with exemption systems, arguably impairing capi-
tal import neutrality in some cases.40
The remainder of this paper examines whether this "paradox of de-
fects" is a necessary feature of a worldwide/credit system or is a result of
corruptions in the present implementation of system that could feasibly
be removed to restore the system and to serve its intended functions
fairly and effectively. The paper also discusses, preliminarily and incom-
pletely, whether the proposed exemption system would free U.S. interna-
tional tax law from the asserted "paradox of defects. '41
37. STAFF OF J. COMM., supra note 14, at 187.
38. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 13, at 104.
39. Id.
40. STAFF OF J. COMM., supra note 14, at 189.
41. For another examination of this issue, see Hugh J. Ault, U.S. Exemption/Territorial
System vs. Credit-Based System, 32 TAX NOTES INT'L 725 (2003).
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III. HOW U.S. MULTINATIONALS NOW ACHIEVE U.S. TAX
RESULTS MORE FAVORABLE THAN THOSE AVAILABLE
UNDER TERRITORIAL TAXATION
Tax advisors have refined international tax planning in the United
States to a fine art. Their tool boxes include numerous techniques for
minimizing U.S. tax on U.S. multinationals' non-U.S. income. In many
applications, these techniques achieve results that are not compatible
with the basic premises of the U.S. international tax system: taxation of
worldwide income with credit for foreign income taxes as needed to alle-
viate double taxation. Cumulatively, they allow many U.S. multinationals
to pay less U.S. tax than they would under an exemption system.
A complete catalogue of the techniques would fill several volumes.
Three commonly employed techniques, representative of three categories
of techniques, are discussed and analyzed below. As shown below, a rela-
tively simple change in the law could eliminate the distortive effects of
each of these techniques. Substantially all of the inappropriate results
possible under present law could similarly be remedied within the frame-
work of a worldwide/credit system.
A. SEPARATION OF FOREIGN INCOME TAXES FROM INCOME ON
WHICH THOSE TAXES WERE IMPOSED
The credit system most dramatically fails to serve its purpose of allevi-
ating double taxation when it allows credit for foreign income taxes on
income that is not subjected to U.S. taxation.
Example 1
USCo, a Delaware corporation, owns 51% of the interests in the
profits and capital of a partnership, PRS, which is organized under
the laws of foreign country X. The remaining interests in the part-
nership are owned, directly and indirectly, by unrelated residents of
country X. For year 1, PRS has net income of $196 from active busi-
ness operations in country X, but makes no distributions to its part-
ners. PRS is a pass-thru entity under the tax laws of country X, and
USCo is legally liable for country X tax of $30 on its share of PRS'
profits. As required by country X law, PRS withholds this tax from
USCo's share of the profits. 42 PRS elects to be taxable as a corpora-
tion for U.S. tax purposes, but because it is, for these purposes, a
foreign corporation with no U.S. trade or business and no income
from U.S. sources, it owes no U.S. tax.
PRS is an example of what is often called a reverse hybrid entity-an
entity that is classified as a corporation for U.S. tax purposes but is fis-
cally transparent under the tax laws of a relevant foreign country. 43
Under the so-called check-the-box regulations, any "business entity,"
other than an entity on a list of per se corporations, may elect for U.S. tax
42. Cf. I.R.C. § 1446 (1994).
43. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.894-1(d)(2)(i) (1996).
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purposes to be either fiscally transparent or an association taxable as a
corporation. 44 The term "business entity" includes any entity that is rec-
ognized for federal tax purposes and is neither classified as a trust nor
"subject to special treatment under the Internal Revenue Code" as, for
example, a regulated investment company ("RIC") or real estate invest-
ment trust ("REIT"). 45 The list of per se corporations consists of entities
organized under the corporation laws of the U.S. states and the one type
of entity under the laws of each foreign country that most resembles an
entity created under a U.S. corporation law. 46 A partnership is a business
entity and is not a per se corporation or a specially treated entity. It may
therefore choose to be classified for U.S. tax purposes as either a partner-
ship or an association taxable as a corporation. In Example 1, PRS
makes the latter choice.
Since PRS elects to be classified as a corporation for U.S. tax purposes,
USCo is treated for these purposes as a shareholder, not a partner. If
PRS's income includes no income taxable to shareholders under the CFC
rules, as is assumed in this example, USCo is only taxed on PRS' income
as it is distributed as dividends. Since PRS distributes no dividends dur-
ing year 1, USCo is not taxed by the United States for the year on any of
PRS's income.
Subject to the credit limitation, a U.S. person is allowed credit against
the U.S. income tax for any foreign income tax "paid" by the person.47 A
foreign income tax is considered paid by "the person on whom foreign
law imposes legal liability for such tax, even if another person (for exam-
ple, a withholding agent) remits such tax." 48 In Example 1, country X law
imposes liability on USCo for country X income tax of $30 on USCo's
50% share of PRS's profits for year 1. Under the legal liability rule,
USCo is deemed to have paid country X tax of $30 for year 1, even
though the tax is actually paid by PRS on USCo's behalf and even though
the United States has not taxed either PRS or USCo on the income that
country X has taxed.
The U.S. tax results in Example 1 are contrary to the basic function of
the foreign tax credit to alleviate double taxation. Although the income
of PRS is taxed by country X, it is not taxed by the United States until it
is distributed to USCo. No double taxation occurs for year 1, and no
credit should be allowed for the year.
Under the proposed exemption system, the problem illustrated by Ex-
ample 1 would disappear in some but not all situations. The proposals
would permanently exempt USCo from U.S. tax on PRS's income and
would allow USCo no credit against U.S. tax for foreign income taxes on
44. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (1996).
45. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a). For RICs and REITs, see 4 BORIS I. BITrKER & LAW-
RENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES & GIFTS 99.4, 99.5 (rev. 3d
ed. 2005).
46. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b).
47. I.R.C. § 901(a).
48. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(f)(1) (1996).
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that income. Since country X taxes on USCo's share of PRS's income
would not be creditable, it would not be relevant that USCo is considered
to have paid the taxes.
However, if USCo owned 50% or less of the interests in PRS, the pro-
posals would not change the objectionable results arising under existing
law. The proposed exemption applies to dividends only if the distributing
corporation is a CFC. PRS, although considered a corporation for U.S.
tax purposes, is not a CFC if USCo owns no more than 50% of the inter-
ests. As such, the proposed exemption for USCo would not apply to divi-
dends from PRS, and the current credit system would extend to USCo
with respect to its interest in PRS.49 The proposals would, therefore, not
obviate the need for the suggested amendment to the check-the-box
regulations.
The Treasury should cure the problem illustrated in Example 1 by
changing the check-the-box regulations. It should add to these regula-
tions a rule requiring a business entity to be classified as fiscally transpar-
ent for U.S. tax purposes with respect to any member or owner of the
entity if, as a result of the entity being fiscally transparent under the tax
laws of a foreign country, the member or owner is legally liable for tax
imposed by that country on any portion of any significant item of income
for the entity. Under such a rule, PRS would be classified as a partner-
ship for U.S. tax purposes because USCo, as a partner, is subject to coun-
try X income tax on its share of PRS's income. USCo would therefore
have to include its distributive share of PRS's income in its U.S. taxable
income for year 1.
The Claims Court's decision in Guardian Industries Corp. v. United
States illustrates another distortion of the credit resulting from the check-
the-box regulations.50 Guardian, a Delaware corporation, was sole owner
of a Luxembourg entity, Guardian Industries Europe (GIE), which was
sole owner of several other Luxembourg entities that had active business
operations in Europe and elsewhere. 51 For purposes of Luxembourg tax
law, the Luxembourg entities constituted a consolidated group of corpo-
rations ("fiscal unity") and GIE, as parent of the group, paid Luxem-
bourg tax on the income of all members of the group. 52 Under the check-
the-box regulations, all of the entities were eligible to choose between
49. It is not clear why the Panel and Joint Committee Staff limited the proposed divi-
dend exemption to dividends from CFCs. This limitation is not found in at least some of
the foreign systems that were apparently the model for the proposals. For example, under
Dutch tax law, a Dutch corporation is allowed a "participation exemption" for dividends it
receives from another corporation, domestic or foreign, if it owns at least 5% of the shares
of the distributing corporation; there is no requirement that the distributing corporation be
controlled by Dutch residents. TAXATION IN THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 18, at 13. The
problem illustrated by Example 1 could be minimized by extending the exemption to divi-
dends received by a domestic corporation from a foreign corporation if the domestic cor-
poration owns at least 10% of the foreign corporation's voting stock, whether or not the
foreign corporation is a CFC.
50. Guardian Indus. Corp. v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 50 (2005).




corporate status and fiscal transparency for U.S. tax purposes. 53 GIE
elected to be a disregarded entity, but the other Luxembourg entities
were considered corporations for U.S. tax purposes.54 Guardian, as sole
owner of GIE, claimed credit for all Luxembourg tax paid by GIE, but it
only included in its GIE income in its U.S. income of calculation, not the
income of the other Luxembourg entities. 55
Under the legal liability rule, the credit claimed by Guardian was fully
allowable only if, under Luxembourg law, (1) GIE had "legal liability"
for the all of the credited taxes and (2) its subsidiaries were not "jointly
and severally liable" for any portion of the taxes.56 Based on expert testi-
mony presented by the parties, the court concluded that, under Luxem-
bourg law, GIE was exclusively liable for Luxembourg taxes on the
group's income.5 7 Since GIE was a disregarded entity for U.S. tax pur-
poses, its liability was considered liability of its owner, Guardian, and
Guardian was therefore deemed to have paid the taxes.58
The results in Guardian Industries are not consistent with the policy of
the foreign tax credit to alleviate double taxation. Guardian was allowed
credit for taxes on income of the lower-tier Luxembourg entities, but
none of the income of these entities was currently subjected to U.S. taxa-
tion. Since the income of the lower-tier entities was not doubly taxed,
credit for foreign income taxes on the income was inappropriate. The
court may have been correct in its application of current law, but the law
is wrong to allow credit in such circumstances.
To address the Guardian Industries distortion, the Treasury should
amend the check-the-box regulations to provide that a foreign entity may
not elect fiscal transparency if it is classified as a corporation under the
tax laws of a foreign country and, as a result, its income is subjected to a
corporate income tax imposed by that country. As applied to the Guard-
ian Industries situation, under this amendment, GIE would be a corpora-
tion, and Guardian, its parent, would not be allowed credit for foreign
income taxes paid by GIE until it received dividends from GIE.
Yes, this would only partially remedy the problem in Guardian Indus-
tries. Assume GIE, the parent Luxembourg entity, has income of 400,
and it has only one subsidiary (GIES), which has income of 600; GIE
pays Luxembourg tax on the group's income of 300, and GIE and GIES
are both corporations for U.S. tax purposes. GIES makes no distribu-
tions to GIE, but GIE distributes dividends of 100 to Guardian. Under
§ 902(a), Guardian, on receiving the dividends, is deemed to have paid
foreign income taxes actually paid by GIE equal to GIE's post-1986 for-
53. Id. at 52.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.901-2(f)(1), (3) (1996). In a case of joint and several liability, for-
eign income taxes must be apportioned among the liable entities in proportion to their
contributions to the foreign tax base.




eign income taxes (300), multiplied by the amount of the dividend (100)
and divided by GIE's post-1986 undistributed earnings (400, less foreign
income taxes of 300).5 9 Guardian must recognize additional dividend in-
come equal to the foreign income taxes deemed paid.60 In sum, Guardian
has dividend income of 400 (sum of 100 and 300) and is deemed to have
paid 300 of foreign income taxes. In Guardian's U.S. return, the effective
rate of foreign income tax is 75% (300/400), even though foreign income
taxes were actually imposed at 30 percent. This distorted result occurs
because GIE is considered payor of all foreign income taxes on the
group's income, even though, for U.S. tax purposes, its undistributed
earnings do not include undistributed income of other members of the
group.
The Treasury could remedy this second distortion in the Guardian In-
dustries situation with a further amendment to the check-the-box regula-
tions: a foreign entity should be considered fiscally transparent for U.S.
tax purposes if, as a result of a consolidation regime under foreign tax
law, its income is included in the tax base of a related entity and it is not
legally liable for foreign income taxes imposed on its income. Under the
suggested amendments to the regulations, the classification of Guardian's
Luxembourg affiliates would all be reversed: GIE would be a corporation
for U.S. tax purposes, and its subsidiaries would be fiscally transparent
for these purposes. All of the group's income, as well as all of its foreign
income taxes, would therefore be income and taxes of GIE.
In sum, the Treasury should make the following amendments to the
check-the-box regulations:
Hybrid entity rule.
A foreign business entity should be classified as an association, taxa-
ble as a corporation, if any material portion of its income is subject
to a corporate income tax for which the entity is legally liable.6 1
Consolidation rule.
A foreign business entity should be fiscally transparent for U.S. tax
purposes if any material portion of its income is subject to a corpo-
rate income tax for which the entity is not legally liable but for which
a related entity is legally liable.
Reverse hybrid entity rule.
A foreign business entity should be fiscally transparent for U.S. tax
purposes with respect to any member or owner of the entity if, as a
result of the entity being fiscally transparent under the tax laws of a
foreign country, the member or owner is legally liable for tax im-
posed by that country on any portion of any significant item of in-
59. See I.R.C. § 902(c)(1), (2) (1994) (defining post-1986 foreign income taxes and
post-1986 foreign income taxes).
60. I.R.C. § 78.
61. The Joint Committee Staff recommended a rule requiring an entity to be treated as
a corporation for federal tax purposes if it is a separate business entity organized under
foreign law and has only one member. STAFF OF J. COMM., supra note 14, at 183.
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come of the entity.62
B. DISTORTIONS OF CREDIT LIMITATION
The facts of Example 1 are not a complete story. Under § 904(a), the
credit for foreign income taxes may not exceed the portion of a tax-
payer's U.S. tax, before credit, that is ratably attributable to taxable in-
come from sources outside the United States. In Example 1, USCo has
no income from foreign sources, therefore, its credit limitation, and hence
the foreign tax credit, are zero. Examples 2 and 3 illustrate means by
which USCo may accomplish the opposite of the result illustrated in Ex-
ample 1: foreign source income with no foreign income taxes.
The idea underlying the credit limitation is that since a U.S. person is
only doubly taxed on income originating outside the United States,
double taxation is fully alleviated by allowing the credit to offset U.S. tax
on income from foreign sources only. 63 The credit limitation poorly
serves this function if (1) types of income taxed by foreign countries on
different bases, are mixed together in computing the limitation or (2)
items that foreign countries do not view as income from sources outside
the United States are treated as foreign source income in the limitation
computation. These distortions are illustrated by Examples 2 and 3.
1. The Look-Thru Loophole in the Basket Regime
Example 2
In addition to its interest in PRS, as assumed in Example 1, USCo
owns valuable intellectual property that it and its affiliates use
throughout the world. USCo licenses country X rights to this prop-
erty to FCo and, for year 1, receives royalties from FCo of $50.
Under country X tax law, PRS is allowed a deduction for the royal-
ties, and because country X has an income tax treaty with the United
States following the U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, country X
imposes no withholding tax on USCo's royalty income. 64
62. See also Lokken, supra note 32 (suggesting similar amendments to check-the-box
regulations to frustrate schemes for avoiding subpart F).
63. See BIrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 3, 72.1.
64. See U.S. Model Income Tax Convention of Sept. 20, 1996, art. 12(1), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/modell996.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Model].
The Model Tax Convention of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) also exempts royalties from withholding tax in the country of source.
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, art. 12(1) (2005), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/49/35363840.pdf. The United States has bilateral income
tax treaties with more than sixty countries. See generally John Venuti et al., Current Status
of U.S. Tax Treaties and International Tax Agreements, 35 TAX MGrr. INT'L J. 38 (2006).
Most U.S. tax treaties follow the Models in exempting royalties from withholding taxes at
source. For a recent example, see Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S., Nov. 6, 2003-




Under U.S. tax law, USCo's royalty income is from foreign sources be-
cause it is received for the use of intellectual property outside the United
States.65 If none of USCo's deductions are allocated or apportioned to
this income,66 USCo has taxable income from sources outside the United
States for year 1 of $50. If its precredit U.S. tax is a flat 35% of taxable
income,67 its credit limitation is $17.5, and its foreign tax credit is $17.5
(lesser of foreign income taxes paid ($30) or the limitation ($17.5)).
Consistently with the role of the credit to alleviate double taxation,
USCo should not be allowed credit for year 1. It is treated as having paid
foreign income taxes on income that has not yet been subject to tax in the
United States, and it has foreign source taxable income that has not been
burdened by tax in any foreign country. Because PRS is allowed deduc-
tions for its royalty payments and USCo's royalty income is exempted
from withholding taxes in country X, the $50 of royalties consists of funds
generated in the business of PRS that country X does not tax at any level.
Since no income of USCo or PRS is doubly taxed in year 1, no credit is
needed to alleviate double taxation.
The credit allowed to USCo is an example of cross crediting: foreign
income taxes on one category of income (PRS' business income) is
credited against U.S. tax on another category of income (USCo's royalty
income). USCo is allowed credit for year 1 only because its active busi-
ness and royalty income and foreign income taxes on this income are ag-
gregated in applying the credit rules.
Since 1986, the United States has had detailed rules limiting cross cred-
iting.68 Generally, foreign-source royalty income is placed in a separate
basket together with other "passive income" from foreign sources, and
foreign income taxes on this income are creditable only to the extent of
the precredit U.S. tax on the income.69 Income from active business op-
erations, as well as taxes on this income, usually fall into a residual cate-
gory, sometimes called the general limitation basket.70 If this separate
limitation regime applied to USCo, its limitation in the passive basket
would be $17.5 (35% of the royalty income of $50), but because it pays no
foreign income taxes on passive income, its credit in this basket would be
zero. Because it would have taxes, but no income, in the general limita-
tion basket, its credit limitation for these taxes would be zero. The sepa-
rate limitations would thus allow USCo no foreign tax credit for year 1.
For U.S. multinationals, however, the separate limitation regime is
qualified by a crucial exception: interest, rents, and royalties received
65. I.R.C. § 862(a)(4).
66. The assumption that none of USCo's deductions are allocated or apportioned to
the royalties is not realistic, but it is a simplification that does not affect the points made
here.
67. A corporation's tax is 35% of taxable income if its taxable income exceeds $10
million. I.R.C. § 11(a).
68. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 3, 1 72.7.1.
69. I.R.C. § 904(d)(1)(A).
70. I.R.C. § 904(d)(1)(I).
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from a CFC of which the recipient is a U.S. shareholder "shall not be
treated as income in a separate category" unless it is "properly allocable
to" income of the CFC in a separate category.71 In other words, royalties
received by a U.S. shareholder from a CFC are passive income only if,
under the U.S. rules for allocating and apportioning deductions, the
CFC's royalty expense is considered a cost of earning passive income of
the CFC.72 Royalty income that is not passive is typically not within any
other specific basket and is thus general limitation income. In the exam-
ples, USCo is a U.S. shareholder of PRS, which is a CFC having only
active business income. USCo's royalty income is therefore general limi-
tation income, and since all of its foreign source income and foreign in-
come taxes are in the same basket, its credit limitation in that basket is
$17.5 (35% of foreign source taxable income of $50), its foreign income
taxes in the basket are $30, and it is allowed credit for year 1 of $17.5.
Congress should amend the look-thru rules to make them inapplicable
to royalties and interest income. The legislative history on the rules states
that they are intended "to make the foreign tax credit limitation treat-
ment of income earned through foreign branches and income earned
through foreign subsidiaries more alike by, in effect, treating income
earned by a foreign subsidiary as if it were earned directly by its U.S.
parent. '73 Whether foreign business is done through a branch or a CFC,
"it is frequently appropriate to allow cross-crediting of taxes paid by one
unit of a worldwide business against income earned by another unit of
that business. '74
However, as applied to royalties and interest income, this analysis
overlooks a crucial difference between branches and subsidiaries. If a
U.S. company does business in country X through a branch located in
that country and utilizes intellectual property it owns in that business,
there are no royalties because the same person both owns and uses the
property. Because a company's country X tax base is not diminished by
deductions for royalties, the portions of the its income that derives from
its use of the intellectual property in country X is taxed by country X on
the same basis as all other income of the country X business. In this case,
the income attributable to the intangible is appropriately included in the
same basket as the other income from the business.
In contrast, if a U.S. company does business in country X through a
subsidiary organized and doing business only in that country, the subsidi-
ary must compensate its parent for its use of intellectual property owned
71. I.R.C. §§ 904(d)(3)(A), (C). These rules also apply to dividends received from a
CFC, but since dividends are typically not deductible by the payor under the tax laws of its
home country, these dividends are not part of the story told in the text.
72. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 99- CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM AcT OF 1986, at 890 (1986) [hereinafter STAFF OF J. COMM., 99TH CONG.].
For allocations and apportionments of deductions, see Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8 (as amended in
2005), discussed in BITrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 3, at 73.10.
73. H.R. Rep. No. 99-841 11-573 (Conf. Rep. 1986).
74. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., supra note 72, at 867.
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by the parent, in the form of royalties.75 The subsidiary is typically al-
lowed deductions for the royalties in determining its country X tax.76
Country X may impose a withholding tax on the parent's royalty income
unless it is barred from doing so by treaty. As noted earlier, income tax
treaties often preclude withholding taxes at source on royalties.
In sum, branches and subsidiaries are not analogous in this context be-
cause countries of source tax income from the use of intellectual property
owned by foreign persons differently, depending on whether the owner
uses the property through a branch or through a subsidiary. Similarly,
interest from a CFC is not analogous to any portion of the return on
capital that a U.S. company invests in a foreign branch because the for-
mer is usually deductible by the payor and taxed at source to the recipi-
ent, if at all, only by a withholding tax, while no such deduction or
withholding tax applies in the latter case.
The policy to alleviate double taxation requires distinctions based on
the manner in which income is taxed by foreign countries. Passive in-
come from foreign sources is usually taxed by foreign countries, if at all,
by withholding taxes imposed on the gross amounts of the income, while
income in the general limitation basket is usually taxed abroad on a net
basis, with deductions for costs associated with the income. Since royal-
ties and interest from a received CFC are usually burdened by foreign
income taxes in the same way as royalties and interest from unrelated
persons, they should be treated the same for purposes of the limitation on
the foreign tax credit. They should, in other words, be in the passive bas-
ket, not the general limitation basket. The look-thru rule for royalties and
interest, which allows these royalties and interest to migrate to the gen-
eral limitation basket, should be repealed.
The proposals of the Panel and the Joint Committee Staff contain noth-
ing analogous to the look-thru rule for royalties and interest income. In
Examples 1 and 2, the proposed exemption would apply to dividends that
USCo may receive from PRS and to country X taxes on USCo's share of
PRS' income, but the royalties from PRS would be included in USCo's
U.S. taxable income, with credit for foreign income taxes on these and
similar items. In the examples, current law, amended to delete the look-
thru rule for royalties and interest income, would yield the same results as
the Panel and staff proposals. The Panel and the Joint Committee Staff,
in other words, share my belief that this rule cannot be part of a rational
U.S. international tax system.
75. Royalties are required by the transfer pricing rules, which require all transactions
between related persons to be priced at arm's length amounts. See BITTKER & LOKKEN,
supra note 3, 79.3.
76. If country X has an income tax treaty with the United States following the U.S.
Model, it must allow deductions for the royalties if it would allow deductions for royalties
paid between residents of country X. U.S. Model, supra note 64, art. 24(3).
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2. Distortions Arising From Inappropriate Source Characterizations
The credit limitation is also corrupted by source rules that sometimes
characterize income that originates, economically, within the United
States as being from foreign sources. The limitation is, very generally, the
portion of the U.S. tax, before credit, that is ratably allocable to taxable
income from sources outside the United States, as determined by the
source rules of the U.S. tax law. 77 To the extent that these rules treat
income that economically originates within the United States as foreign
source income, they effectively allow foreign income taxes to be credited
against U.S. tax on income from U.S. sources.
Example 3
In addition to the facts assumed in Examples 1 and 2, assume USCo
produces widgets in the United States and sells them to its U.S. and
foreign affiliates, including PRS, which resell the goods to customers
in their respective jurisdictions. Title to the goods sold to PRS passes
from USCo to PRS when PRS receives the goods in country X. For
year 1, USCo has taxable income of $100 on sales of widgets to PRS.
Country X taxes PRS's income on its resales of the goods, but be-
cause USCo has no permanent establishment outside the United
States, neither country X nor any other foreign country taxes any
portion of USCo's income on its sales to PRS.
USCo's income on the sales to PRS is from sources partly within the
United States, where USCo produces the goods, and partly from sources
in country X, where its sales to PRS are deemed to occur. 78 For purposes
of the U.S. source rules, a sale of goods occurs where "the rights, title,
and interest of the seller in the property are transferred to the buyer." 79
Since title passes from USCo to PRS in country X, the sales are deemed
to occur in country X. Unless a taxpayer elects otherwise, income on a
sale of goods that the taxpayer produces in the United States and sells
outside the United States is apportioned equally between U.S. and for-
eign sources. 80 Absent such an election, $50 of USCo's $100 of income
on sales to PRS is from U.S. sources, and $50 is from foreign sources.
Combining Examples 1, 2, and 3, USCo has taxable income from for-
eign sources of $100 (royalties of $50 and sales income of $50). Its credit
limitation is thus $35 (35% of $100). Since its foreign income taxes are
$30, USCo is allowed credit for year 1 for all of these taxes.
77. I.R.C. § 904(a) (1994). These rules are found in §§ 861-865. See BrrrKER & LOK-
KEN, supra note 3, 73.1.
78. I.R.C. § 863(b).
79. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.861-7(c), 1.863-3(c)(2) (1996).
80. Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(b)(1) (1996). The regulations allow two elective alternatives:
an independent factory price (IFP) method, and a books and records method. The IFP
method may be elected only if the taxpayer establishes an independent factory price for
the goods. Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(b)(2) (1996). The books and records method may only be
used with the IRS' advance approval. Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(b)(3) (1996). See BrIrKER &
LOKKEN, supra note 3, 73.6.3.
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As in Examples 1 and 2, no credit is needed to alleviate double taxa-
tion because none of USCo's income is doubly taxed. Moreover, country
X's failure to tax any portion of USCo's sales income is not a mere indul-
gence allowed by that country's lawmakers. By international consensus,
a country may only tax business profits of a resident of another country if
that person has a permanent establishment in the taxing country, and
given such a permanent establishment, the country may only tax business
profits to the extent they are attributable to the permanent establish-
ment. 81 None of USCo's income is attributable to a foreign permanent
establishment. All of its income on sales to PRS derives from its activities
in the United States. By characterizing one half of such income as for-
eign-source, U.S. law effectively allows U.S. exporters to credit foreign
income taxes against U.S. tax on U.S. income, contrary to the policy of
restricting the credit to alleviating double taxation.
To remedy this distortion, Congress should conform the U.S. source
rules to international practices in taxing business income. Income of a
U.S. person on sales of goods should be entirely from U.S. sources, ex-
cept to the extent it is attributable to a permanent establishment of the
person outside the United States.82 The amount of income attributable
to a permanent establishment should be determined as though the per-
manent establishment were a separate entity dealing at arm's length with
all other aspects of the taxpayer's business and investment activities.83
The current source rules for sales income would operate equally mis-
chievously under the proposals of the Panel and the Joint Committee
Staff. Because USCo's sales income is neither CFC dividends nor income
of a foreign branch, it would not be within the proposed exemption. But,
if, under the proposals, all nonexempt income is lumped together in de-
termining the limitation on the credit for foreign income taxes on nonex-
81. The best evidence of international consensus on tax jurisdiction is the OECD's
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, which the OECD adopted as a guide for
the formulation of income tax treaties between OECD members but is widely used by
other countries in negotiating tax treaties. OECD Model Tax Convention art. 7(1), July 15,
2005 [hereinafter OECD Model]. The U.S. Model Income Tax Convention is based on the
OECD Model, as is a Model adopted by a United Nations group for use in developing
income tax treaties between developed and developing countries. U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. &
Soc. AFFAIRS, U.N. MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/21 (2001). See BITrKER
& LOKKEN, supra note 3, 1 65.1.6. The description in the text is a summary of article 7(1)
of the OECD Model. Articles 7(1) of the U.S. and United Nations Models are essentially
identical.
82. The makings of such an amendment may be found in I.R.C. § 865(e)(1) (West
2006), which uses the term "office or other fixed places of business" instead of "permanent
establishment" but with no essential change in meaning. Compare OECD Model, supra
note 81, art. 5, with I.R.C. § 864(c).
Congress should also revise the source rules applicable to foreign persons selling goods.
Section 865(e)(2), which generally parallels treaty law, should be made the exclusive rule
for determining the source of sales income, rather than a supplement to the title passage
rule, as it is now.
83. This is the treaty rule for determining income attributable to permanent establish-




empt income, sales income that is assigned to foreign sources, and not
taxed by any foreign country, would enhance the credit limitation for for-
eign taxes on other nonexempt income. Even if the new law preserved
the present basket system, the source rule for sales income could con-
tinue to distort the limitation for taxpayers such as USCo. For example, if
USCo's royalties (Example 2) were subjected to substantial withholding
taxes and the law continued to contain a look-thru rule for royalties, in-
come on the sales, to the extent characterized as being from foreign
sources but not taxed by any foreign country, would raise the limitation
to provide greater credit for foreign income taxes on the royalties.
Further, as in Example 1, the proposals would make no change in the
results in Example 3 if USCo owned 50% or less of the interests in PRS,
and so proscribing PRS characterization as a CFC. In this case, both
USCo's sales income and the taxes on PRS's income would be outside the
exemption system and subject to the residual credit system, which would
presumably operate as it does under current law.
Moreover, the source rule for sales income could inappropriately ex-
pand the proposed exemption by characterizing income originating in the
United States as income of a foreign branch. Assume USCo has a branch
in country Y that sells goods produced by USCo in the United States.
Under the sales source rule, USCo income on producing and selling these
goods would be allocated one half to U.S. sources and one half to foreign
sources. If the foreign-source portion is taken to be the income of the
country Y branch, it would, under the proposals, be exempt from U.S.
tax. However, if the income derives primarily from USCo's manufacture
of the goods and only incidentally from the sales activities of the branch,
the exempted income would include income that originates economically
in the United States and could not be taxed by country Y. This might be
the case if, for example, USCo's country Y sales were large in dollar
amount, but were made to a small number of independent distributors,
and the branch's function was to service USCo's relationship with the
distributors. In such a case, the amount attributable to USCo's perma-
nent establishment in country Y, which is the maximum amount that
country Y could tax under an income tax treaty between country Y and
the United States, may be significantly less than one half of the income.
If so, the proposed exemption would extend to income that is outside the
taxing jurisdiction of all countries other than the United States.
IV. CONCLUSION
The principal claim of this paper is that deficiencies in the current
worldwide base/credit system do not provide a strong reason for substi-
tuting the exemption system advocated by the Panel and Joint Committee
staff. These deficiencies are not inherent in the current system and can
be corrected without changing the fundamental premises of U.S. interna-
tional income taxation. Moreover, if not corrected, many of these defi-
ciencies will plague the proposed system much as they have the current
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system. The Panel and the Joint Committee Staff fell into a common er-
ror in tax policy discussions: comparing current law, in its highly-cor-
rupted state, with an idealized alternative and reaching the obvious
conclusion that the latter is preferable. In fairness, the proposed system
must be compared with the best feasible version of a worldwide/credit
system.
The examples discussed in this paper do not completely catalogue the
shortcomings of current law, neither would the suggestions offered to
eliminate the distortions seen in the examples would not remedy all of
the shortcomings. Some observers may argue that the process of identify-
ing and repairing each failure of current law to effect its policies would be
a never-ending, futile exercise. However, as demonstrated in the analysis
of the examples, this process would not be obviated by the proposed ex-
emption system. It may be inherent in all income taxes.
This paper does not address the other claim made by the Panel and the
Joint Committee Staff in support of their proposals: that an exemption
system would be less inefficient economically because it would interfere
less with business and investment decisions. That argument is merely a
corollary of the real issue, that the flaws in the current system foster in-
consistent results that diverge from the purported policy of the system.
These flaws cause the distortion of business and investment decisions.
This paper argues that an exemption system is not the only cure to these
present ills. It is with this realization that a proposal for an exemption
system must be consolidated.
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